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 Gernot Erler 
 
Gernot Erler is Minister of State at the German Federal Foreign Office, a position he has oc-
cupied since November 2005. 
 
Erler has been a member of Germany’s Social Democratic Party (SPD) since 1970, and has 
made a name for himself as an expert in peace and security affairs. He has been a Member of 
the German Bundestag for Freiburg since 1987 and the directly elected representative of that 
constituency since 1998. From 1998 to 2005, he was the Deputy Chairman of the SPD Par-
liamentary Group with responsibility for International Affairs, exercising a major influence on 
his party’s foreign and security policy. As co-ordinator of German-Russian intersocietal co-
operation from 2003-2006, he helped to intensify civil-society dialogue between the two 
countries. 
 
Gernot Erler’s major political interest is development issues in relation to the states of Central 
and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, as his many interviews and publications 
demonstrate. He is the author of both Global Monopoly. Weltpolitik nach dem Ende der Sow-
jetunion [Global Monopoly: Geopolitics following the Demise of the Soviet Union] and most 
recently Russland Kommt: Putins Staat - Der Kampf um Macht und Modernisierung [Russia 
is Coming: Putin’s State – The Struggle for Power and Modernization], in which he critically 
analyses current developments in Russia. 
 
Erler, who speaks fluent Russian, is also the President of the Südosteuropa-Gesellschaft 
[South-East European Association], member of the German steering committee of the “St. 
Petersburg Dialogue”, Chairman of the German-Bulgarian Forum and the West–Ost–Gesell-
schaft Südbaden [West-East Society of South Baden], and a member of the Board of Trustees 
of the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg (IFSH). 
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 Executive Summary 
 
The OSCE is at a crossroads. The consensus around its standards and commitments and the 
participating States’ faith in them have started to erode. Central tasks and functions of the Or-
ganization are openly called into question. The OSCE participating States now face the chal-
lenge of reversing the current tendency towards the weakening of OSCE institutions and in-
struments, and collectively restoring the Organization’s ability to reach agreement and to act. 
 
At the Brussels Ministerial Council, therefore, we must act decisively to implement the man-
date for reform contained in the Ljubljana Decision on “Strengthening the Effectiveness of the 
OSCE”. Above all, this means, firstly, reaffirming fundamental and long-established OSCE 
principles and, secondly, securing and – where possible – strengthening the independence and 
key functions of the institutions, field presences, and election monitoring missions. However, 
it also means, thirdly, that we need to take seriously demands for more partnership-based ap-
proaches, for a better balance in terms of both geography and issues, and for more transpar-
ency and participation. Wherever the concrete implementation of these demands would con-
tribute to strengthening the OSCE, Germany will support them. This is particularly true of our 
support for the Kazakh candidacy for the OSCE Chairmanship in 2009. It touches upon a 
central question of the reform discussion and hence also the basic understanding of the OSCE 
as a co-operative security organization: the identification of all OSCE participating States 
with the Organization and their equal participation therein. 
 
In Brussels we have a choice: If we want an OSCE that makes an effective contribution to co-
operative security, the rule of law, institutional reform, and conflict resolution, we must fight 
to ensure that the reform process has a substantive result. Given the wide variety of positions 
held by the participating States, this will require from each the highest degree of willingness 
to reach a consensus and to co-operate. Germany will push hard to achieve this. 
 
If we fail to reach this central goal in Brussels, other, more effective international organiza-
tions will have to take over key security policy tasks that the OSCE is no longer capable of 
performing. It is therefore up to the OSCE participating States themselves to decide whether 
they wish to strengthen the OSCE as the only pan-European forum for security co-operation, 
or whether political problems in the OSCE area will henceforth be dealt with in bodies in 
which not all OSCE participating States have an equal right to participate and to vote. 
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 Germany and OSCE Reform 
 
Despite the naysayers and their prophecies of doom, there is life in the OSCE yet: During the 
Permanent Council discussion of the report of an OSCE Head of Mission in March 2006, the 
Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation expressed his “alarm” over the human 
rights situation in a participating State and appealed to the OSCE Mission to exercise its man-
date to the fullest extent possible in this critical area. The Russian Permanent Representative 
called for the participating State in question to bring its internal situation in line with its 
OSCE commitments. This example shows that even Russia, the OSCE’s biggest and harshest 
critic, is willing to make use of the Organization and to appeal to its norms and standards – 
even if this is clearly not without contradiction. And the Russian intervention in the Perman-
ent Council is just one arbitrary example of a participating State making active use of OSCE 
norms and instruments. 
 
A further case in point: During the 2005 OSCE Human Dimension Implementation Meeting, 
the British Government answered criticism from the OSCE participating States with respect to 
its implementation of electoral commitments. The UK organized what is known as a “Side 
Event” to discuss the report made by a small mission of experts from the OSCE Office for 
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) on the British general election of 5 May 
2005. Critical questions were raised there that focused on problems of implementation high-
lighted in the report. A prominent complaint concerned the lack of legislation to allow inter-
national and domestic election observers access to polling stations in line with the commit-
ments contained in the Copenhagen Document. The Belarusian delegation showed particular 
interest in the British delegation’s explanation of how the UK would overcome these issues in 
the future.  
 
The third and final example is the visit of the Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairman-
in-Office on Combating Intolerance and Discrimination against Muslims, Ambassador Ömür 
Orhun, to Germany in the spring of 2006. The aim of this visit, which was arranged in re-
sponse to an invitation from the German Government, was for the Personal Representative to 
gain an impression of the extent to which Germany was fulfilling its OSCE commitments on 
non-discrimination with regard to its Muslim population. Ambassador Orhun took issue, 
above all, with the catalogue of questions that Muslims applying for German citizenship in the 
State of Baden-Württemberg were being asked to answer. Ambassador Orhun stressed that by 
focusing on personal opinions and attitudes, this procedure constituted a violation of human 
rights. Opposing this practice, he supported a standardized procedure for the whole of Ger-
many that would deal solely with the applicant’s knowledge of matters of fact. 
 
All the above are arbitrarily selected cases. I am not interested right now in whether the criti-
cism raised in each case was justified or whether it proved completely unfounded. What is 
important is that these cases illuminate in an exemplary manner the strengths and comparative 
advantages of the OSCE within the international security architecture. They show clearly that 
the OSCE participating States concern themselves – within a framework in which they are 
equals – with developments in other OSCE States in the areas of rule of law, democracy, and 
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 human rights, i.e. with central aspects of their domestic affairs. This is based on a belief that 
the manifold challenges to security and stability are better met by constructive collective ef-
fort, dialogue, the sharing of experience, and co-operation than by national unilateralism. Un-
fortunately, an all too widespread and stubborn prejudice alleges that the real aims are to 
preach, censure, and humiliate. In fact, it is rather a matter of the OSCE States advising each 
other at an early stage of potential problematic developments and risks for security and co-
operation in Europe. By providing this early warning function, the OSCE takes on a vital role 
in the concert of Euro-Atlantic security organizations. That applies equally – even particularly 
– in the age of globalization. 
 
The OSCE is based upon a commitment to effective multilateralism, to an enlarged concept of 
security, and to an ambitious community of values with equal rights and duties for all partici-
pating States. To achieve this, the OSCE participating States have created an extensive 
acquis of highly detailed common norms, standards, and commitments in all three dimen-
sions, whose ongoing development they actively pursue. These politically binding rules apply 
to all OSCE participating States. They may legitimately be appealed to in the course of the 
Organization’s intensive dialogue and co-operative activities. In the 1991 Moscow Document, 
the participating States set out in particularly striking terms just how far this mutual trust and 
the will to co-operate could extend. They declared “categorically and irrevocably […] that the 
commitments undertaken in the field of the human dimension of the CSCE are matters of dir-
ect and legitimate concern to all participating States and do not belong exclusively to the in-
ternal affairs of the State concerned”. This far-reaching avowal is an expression of the com-
mon goal agreed in the Paris Charter according to which: “Our States will co-operate and 
support each other with the aim of making democratic gains irreversible.” 
 
Unfortunately, this ideal depiction of an ambitious, co-operative security and value commu-
nity in a Europe retaining all its heterogeneity reflects only one portion of reality. The OSCE 
acquis and the commitment to it are showing signs of fragility. This could be seen particularly 
clearly in the Uzbek city of Andijan, where security forces seeking to suppress unrest herded 
together and indiscriminately fired upon hundreds of peaceful protestors. In contravention of 
all OSCE rules, the Uzbek Government refused even to talk with the Organization, rejected 
all criticism as unacceptable interference in its internal affairs, and dismissed ODIHR’s re-
ports on the events and the trials that followed. What Tashkent could not avoid, however, 
were the legitimate claims made by those who sought to measure Uzbekistan against its polit-
ically binding OSCE commitments to uphold human rights and the rule of law. 
 
Basic OSCE standards were also disregarded in the recent presidential elections in Belarus. 
According to the OSCE/ODIHR election observation mission, campaigning and voting were 
characterized by a climate of intimidation, large-scale obstruction of opponents’ campaign ef-
forts, partisan media reporting, a lack of independence on the part of the Election Commis-
sion, counting procedures that lacked transparency, and considerable interference in the work 
of OSCE/ODIHR election observers. The mission’s conclusion that fundamental OSCE prin-
ciples for free and fair elections as agreed by the governments of the OSCE participating 
States in the Copenhagen Document had thereby been breached was rejected by the Bela-
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 rusian Government as biased and partial. Openly flouting the OSCE acquis, the Belarusian 
Government intimated that the evaluation of the elections should be carried out primarily with 
reference to relevant national laws. 
 
The consensus on the central tasks and functions of the OSCE is indeed showing signs of ero-
sion, as the above examples suggest. Among the accusations made by individual participating 
States are: paternalism, political bias, interference in domestic affairs, and an imbalance in 
OSCE activities in terms of both geography and the issues focused on. The critics have their 
sights set on the OSCE’s election observation missions and field presences, whose resources 
are said to be concentrated largely on states “East of Vienna” and on the human dimension. 
They say that the Organization requires fundamental reform as the security challenges it faces 
have undergone a complete transformation. 
 
Although many of the accusations are groundless, the participating States have taken the criti-
cism seriously. That the OSCE reacted to these calls at all is a sign of its vitality and a basic 
willingness to seek consensus that should not be underestimated. Its answer has also been 
substantive. We can thank the Bulgarian and Slovenian Chairmanships that systematic prepar-
ations for a reform debate were undertaken by the Panel of Eminent Persons on Strengthening 
the Effectiveness of the OSCE, which was assembled to represent the diversity of participat-
ing States for this purpose (and to which Germany’s Ambassador retired Wilhelm Höynck, 
the first Secretary General of the OSCE, belonged). By making specific, collectively agreed 
recommendations for reform, the Panel indicated a route to renewing the consensus over the 
OSCE. Building on this foundation, the Ministerial Council in Ljubljana was able to achieve 
unanimity on a key political document for the first time in years, and to formulate a compre-
hensive mandate for reform, thereby restoring the OSCE’s common denominator. 
 
The consensus over this mandate is a great opportunity that we must be brave enough to use. 
Our challenge is now to build upon this common denominator and, despite sometimes holding 
very different positions, to make the effort to achieve substantive results, namely consensus 
on the central aspects of reform. There is no doubt that this will be a difficult task. It will take 
constructive, creative approaches to fully explore how the OSCE participating States can im-
prove their ability to collectively deal with the changing set of challenges they face. The Min-
isterial Decision of Ljubljana has given us a narrow window of opportunity: The reform pack-
age must be ready by December 2006. Each delay will detract from the momentum that the 
reform process currently has and will inevitably damage its substance. 
 
The aim of reform – as spelled out in the title of the Decision adopted in Ljubljana – must be 
to strengthen the Organization. It cannot be to weaken it. The reform process must therefore 
ensure that fundamental, long-established OSCE principles and structures emerge strength-
ened from this debate. This applies to the OSCE’s norms and standards, and to the independ-
ence and the key functions of its institutions and missions. We will therefore always support 
demands for more emphasis on partnership in the Organization, for better geographical and 
thematic balance, and for more transparency and participation if and when their concrete im-
plementation would lead to improvements in the effectiveness of the OSCE. 
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 With respect to the central topics in the reform discussion, this would mean the following: 
 
The allegation that the OSCE/ODIHR election observation missions amount to instruments 
for “regime change” rests on a fundamental misunderstanding. Democratic changes of gov-
ernment are based on the results of elections, not on the observation of electoral processes. 
OSCE/ODIHR election observation missions do not themselves intervene in the electoral 
process, but restrict themselves to ascertaining, via observation, whether OSCE standards and 
norms for free and fair elections have been upheld and, hence, whether the fundamental pre-
conditions for democratic decision-making have been fulfilled. This task is performed ac-
cording to a methodology that has been developed and continually refined in over 150 elec-
tion observation missions so far deployed in numerous OSCE States, from the USA to Kaz-
akhstan. By professionally and responsibly evaluating the integrity of elections, the 
OSCE/ODIHR election observation missions have made a decisive contribution to the con-
solidation of democracy and the legitimacy of parliaments and governments throughout the 
OSCE area. Their credibility continues to rest critically upon the preservation of their oper-
ational independence and key functions. We endanger their operational independence if we 
interfere in key prerogatives of the ODIHR Director – whether these are decisions as to which 
elections should be observed, questions of methodology, or the appointments of heads of 
election observation missions. Giving the OSCE participating States a formal role in such 
processes would politicize these questions. This would damage both the credibility of the 
election observation missions and their operational value; in the last instance – where no con-
sensus could be achieved – it could even paralyse the work of election observation itself. 
 
We must also ensure that the integrity of elections continue to be evaluated promptly and 
publicly. The alternative, demanded by some participating States – that the missions act as 
partners in providing advice and support to help the host state eliminate proven difficulties 
(which, it should be noted, is already the case) – cannot replace assessing whether the elect-
oral process has complied with OSCE criteria. In cases where government and opposition dis-
agree as to the legitimacy of an election, an election observation mission can play a particu-
larly vital peacekeeping role as a neutral, impartial agency. 
 
A number of reform proposals that would bring us closer to the goal of strengthening the 
election observation missions focus above all on the question of raising acceptance levels. At 
present, too little is known of the missions’ professional, responsible methods. But even sim-
ple measures, such as increasing transparency by raising the frequency of ODIHR’s briefings 
to the Permanent Council, could help to remedy this. 
 
However, what would carry greater political weight would be an improved willingness on the 
part of all OSCE participating States to provide observers for OSCE/ODIHR election obser-
vation missions. This is the only way we can achieve the crucial goal of a geographically bal-
anced staffing of the missions. We can only create a situation where all partake equally of this 
central OSCE instrument if each OSCE participating State makes an appropriate contribution 
to this task and assumes its fair share of responsibility according to its means. By giving every 
state a greater role in shaping the missions’ activities, this would be likely to raise the mis-
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 sions’ general acceptance. For this reason, we are willing to act – where necessary – as part-
ners in providing OSCE participating States with support that will enable them to dispatch ob-
servers. We would be particularly willing to provide support to overcome financial and lin-
guistic hurdles and to help with the training of observers. Standardized training in accordance 
with the norms and standards of the OSCE, in particular, is decisive for the quality and cred-
ibility of the missions. Observers that (deliberately) ignore the OSCE/ODHIR Observer Code 
of Conduct endanger this vital work. There is no room in the election observation missions for 
mavericks, activists, or crusaders with a personal agenda. What are required are level-headed, 
perceptive, and trustworthy experts. In the recent past, individual OSCE/ODIHR observers 
and even entire observation teams have made statements to the media that differed from their 
mission’s overall evaluation. This is a cause of great concern, as it undermines both the mis-
sion’s conclusions and its credibility. It is therefore important that the prerogative of speaking 
to the media be reserved exclusively for Heads of Mission, who, in addition – and in contrast 
to the individual observers – also possess the necessary broad perspective. 
 
If the consensus over OSCE/ODIHR election monitoring nevertheless does finally collapse, 
and OSCE election monitoring thereby loses its independence and effectiveness, these tasks 
will sooner or later be taken over by other actors, such as the European Union within the 
scope of its neighbourhood policy. The EU showed that it was quite capable of performing 
election observation in the presidential and parliamentary elections in Afghanistan, an OSCE 
Partner for Co-operation.1
 
The OSCE’s field missions are another of its comparative strengths, and we should be careful 
that this advantage is not squandered during the reform discussions. They are a unique co-
operative instrument for promoting the rule of law and institutional reform. From Sarajevo to 
Astana, 3,200 experts are currently involved in providing participating States with support 
and advice in their efforts to reform and implement the OSCE acquis, thereby ending the div-
ision of Europe once and for all. The OSCE is characterized by its presence in participating 
States in the form of field missions and field offices, its closeness to the problems and (state 
and civil-society) actors, its flexibility, and the range of its activities across all three dimen-
sions. These include such diverse tasks as multiethnic police training in Kosovo, the conver-
sion of toxic rocket fuel in Armenia, and the production of human-rights textbooks for schools 
in Kyrgyzstan. 
 
The missions can only work effectively when host states do not perceive their presence as a 
stigma, but as an offer that has been made to them and an opportunity they may wish to grasp. 
Moreover, both sides must be willing to co-operate on the basis of openness, trust, and part-
nership. By retreating to extreme positions, such as insisting on the unlimited autonomy of the 
field missions, on the one hand, or refusing constructive co-operation with them, on the other, 
we achieve precisely the opposite. Acceptance cannot simply be demanded, but must be 
gained in a dialogue based on trust – and this asks questions of both sides. The yardstick for 
co-operation between the field missions and their host states’ governments must, however, 
                                                 
1  The OSCE has itself so far sent two “Election Support Teams” to Afghanistan: to the presidential elections in 2004 and to the 2005 
National Assembly elections. 
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 remain the OSCE’s indivisible acquis. Restricting the activities of the field missions to parts 
of the acquis would therefore be illegitimate and artificial, it would also be inappropriate be-
cause not consistent with the OSCE’s enlarged concept of security, whose dimensions are 
often intertwined in complex ways. For example, the police programme in Kyrgyzstan, which 
encompasses both equipment and training aid, may be considered primarily a politico-military 
matter but, because it also involves anti-corruption measures and human rights, equally 
touches upon the second and third dimensions. 
 
Also questionable are simplistic demands for the establishment of geographical balance in the 
distribution of the field missions within the OSCE area. It is claimed, for instance, that the al-
legedly one-sided current concentration on the area “East of Vienna” needs to be balanced by 
the creation of missions in places such as Northern Ireland and the Basque Country. As long 
as the OSCE’s resources remain limited, however, we would be well advised to apply the 
means at our disposal where the need for effective support with reform and transformation 
processes and conflict resolution is greatest. OSCE field missions are not established with the 
intention of creating a presence spread equally throughout the OSCE area, but rather in order 
to deploy the OSCE’s limited resources where they are needed most. The same naturally ap-
plies to the decision as to which OSCE participating States should receive the bulk of 
OSCE/ODIHR election observation missions. 
 
The proposals made within the reform debate on introducing what have become known as 
“thematic missions” are certainly capable of contributing to the strengthening of the OSCE. 
“Thematic missions” could deal with issues that cannot be contained within the OSCE’s usual 
categories and which affect several participating States (such as intolerance or human traf-
ficking). Nonetheless, it would be a fundamental mistake to believe that these kinds of mis-
sions, which devote themselves to a single limited topic on a project-like basis, could replace 
the classical field missions with their broad cross-dimensional approach. The two approaches 
are not alternatives, but distinct options that are perfectly capable of functioning together in a 
complementary manner. 
 
One of the OSCE’s classical security competencies, namely mediating in what have been 
dubbed “frozen conflicts”, for which it has a clear mandate, has come under serious danger of 
being eroded in recent years. The OSCE’s efforts in Georgia/South Ossetia, Moldova/Trans-
dniestria, and Nagorno-Karabakh have so far produced few tangible results. While OSCE dip-
lomacy has had a positive effect in terms of conflict prevention and has at least managed to 
prevent the three conflicts from once again becoming “hot”, in no case has any progress been 
made towards actually tackling the roots of the conflict. Here, the conflict parties have clearly 
lacked the necessary political will to make constructive use of the OSCE’s mediation mech-
anisms. Even the enlargement of the negotiating format, as in the case of Moldova/Trans-
dniestria, where the EU and the USA have been included as observers, has so far not really 
moved us forwards. If the stagnation continues, the value and purpose of the OSCE’s conflict 
resolution mandate will come under ever stronger criticism, and the search for alternative, 
more effective conflict resolution mechanisms will accelerate. It is therefore up to the OSCE 
participating States themselves to decide whether they will retain this central political instru-
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 ment, or lose it. We can by all means see the comparative advantage of pursuing conflict 
resolution in the OSCE context, where all conflict parties have an equal right to participate 
and to vote (“inclusiveness”). Nonetheless, if it continues to be impossible to muster the ne-
cessary political will, the OSCE will be supplanted in this area sooner or later. For reasons of 
security and stability, we simply cannot afford to accept the current stagnation in the resolu-
tion of the frozen conflicts. The EU also has a vital interest in seeing the conflicts in its im-
mediate neighbourhood resolved, and, in the form of the European Security and Defence Pol-
icy, has created an instrument that is capable of taking on this task. 
 
Ultimately, the central question in the reform discussion is that of participation: To what ex-
tent do the individual OSCE States identify with the Organization, its goals, and its instru-
ments? To what degree do they consider the Organization to be theirs? In order to achieve a 
sustainable consensus on the OSCE, participation is absolutely essential. Without it, the Or-
ganization will not be able to comprehensively restore its ability to reach agreements and to 
take action. The institutional foundations for this are already in place: The OSCE participating 
States have equal political standing and rights and are equally able to guide and shape devel-
opments in the Organization. Often, however, they do not make sufficient use of this oppor-
tunity. We should encourage them to do so and support appropriate initiatives. Foremost 
among these is Kazakhstan’s application for the OSCE Chairmanship in 2009. Germany sup-
ports Kazakhstan’s candidacy. For, if we really mean what we say about the equality of par-
ticipation of all OSCE States, the time is now ripe for the leadership of the OSCE to pass to a 
state that has been accompanied by the CSCE/OSCE since the start of its – still incomplete – 
journey of transformation. For Kazakhstan to be installed as the OSCE’s primus inter pares 
requires a high degree of credible identification on the part of that country with the Organiza-
tion. By taking on the role, Kazakhstan would demonstrate a willingness to assume responsi-
bility and to champion the OSCE acquis and instruments. A Kazakh OSCE Chairmanship 
would have considerable resonance within the region and would encourage the Central Asian 
states as a whole to conceive of themselves as active “co-owners” of the Organization, not 
merely as addressees of its policies. 
 
Besides the Kazakh candidacy, there are many other means by which the participation of all 
OSCE States may be gradually improved. The success of many innovative approaches to new 
security threats that have recently grown in prominence within the OSCE, such as terrorism, 
trafficking in human beings, and intolerance, should be an inspiration and encouragement for 
each participating State to develop its own initiatives. There is also a need to make up lost 
ground by grasping the available opportunities with regard to the staffing of the Secretariat, 
the field presences, and the election observation missions. In the first instance, this requires 
the countries that have so far been underrepresented to take steps to increase the number of 
suitable applicants they can propose for these positions. 
 
It is also important that the OSCE be helped to regain its role as a multi-dimensional security 
organization, in which politico-military questions will take on greater prominence alongside 
the human and economic and environmental dimensions. While the OSCE remains the anchor 
of conventional arms control and military transparency in Europe, its potential as a forum for 
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 security co-operation is not being fully exploited. The role of the Forum for Security Co-
operation – to help create an atmosphere of openness and trust in politico-military questions 
and to develop means of reducing the risk of armed conflict – remains unchanged and needs 
to be given concrete form. The 1999 Vienna Document and the Code of Conduct on Politico-
Military Aspects of Security, efforts to combat the illicit spread of small arms and light 
weapons, including portable air defence systems (MANPADS) and ammunition, and the ex-
tensive project work carried out under the OSCE’s auspices offer many opportunities for en-
hanced co-operation, and these are very far from being exhausted. 
 
Germany supports, and will continue to commit considerable political, personnel, and finan-
cial resources to, an effective OSCE that makes a substantive contribution to co-operative se-
curity, rule of law, institutional reform, and conflict resolution. In 2005, we were once again 
one of the OSCE’s largest contributors, allocating some four million euros for voluntary con-
tributions and the secondment of personnel to OSCE missions in addition to our compulsory 
contribution. In the same year, around 80 German experts were seconded to the Secretariat, 
institutions, and missions, and some 350 German election monitors took part in OSCE/ 
ODIHR election observation missions. We therefore have a great interest in efforts to reform 
and strengthen the OSCE. We are confronted with the major challenge of reversing the cur-
rent tendency towards the erosion of the acquis and the weakening of OSCE institutions and 
instruments, and of collectively restoring the Organization’s ability to reach agreement and to 
act. Given the wide variety of objectives among the participating States, this task will require 
the highest degree of willingness to reach a consensus and to co-operate – if we want to 
achieve substantive results.  
 
For our part, we are ready to support all reform proposals that will help to strengthen the 
OSCE. However, if we fail to realize this central goal at the Ministerial Council in Brussels, 
we will be accelerating a process in which key tasks that the OSCE is no longer capable of 
performing will have to be taken over by other, more effective international actors. The EU, 
in particular, has a justified interest in this, especially within the scope of its neighbourhood 
policy. It also has a suitable instrument in the shape of the European Security and Defence 
Policy. It is up to the OSCE participating States to decide whether they remain at the helm. 
However, if the political will to strengthen the OSCE as the only pan-European forum for se-
curity co-operation should prove lacking, political problems will henceforth be dealt with in 
bodies in which not all OSCE participating States have an equal right to participate and to 
vote. 
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